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Abstract
The increasing dominance of Asian manufacturing firms in the global economy has raised an important
issue: whether these firms’ superior manufacturing performance is caused by their management control
systems, the national culture of their employees, or the interaction of these two factors. This experimental
study provides a direct test of the effects of national culture and management control system on
manufacturing performance. The dimension of national culture studied was individualism ( vs collectivism )
because this work-related attribute has been noted as a major difference between Asian and Western
cultures. In turn, the focus on cultural individualism motivated a study of two aspects of management
controls: work flow interdependence and pay interdependence. The results are consistent with cultural
individualism and management controls having independent, but not interactive, effects on manufacturing
performance. The potential implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.
The globalization of the world economy has
greatly increased manufacturing firms’ concern
with maintaining their competitive advantage.
In the U.S.A., considerable attention has been
focused on that country’s declining competitive-
ness in manufacturing (Hayes & Abernathy,
1980; Hayes et al., 1988; Skinner, 1985). Critics
have attributed this situation, in part, to U.S.
firms’ management control systems (Hayes &
Abernathy, 1980; Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984;
Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1983, 1984).
In the meantime, firms from the Asian countries
have become increasingly dominant in many
segments of the world market. This develop-
ment has prompted U.S. academics and busines-
ses to study the Asian firms’ management control
systems, with a view towards transplanting such
systems to U.S. firms.
The success of many Asian manufacturing
firms is due in part to their producing superior
quality products at a lower cost. However, an
issue that remains unresolved is whether this
manufacturing performance is the result of these
firms’ management controls, the national
“<n t-arlier version of this paper was presented at the 12th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association.
wuttgart, 1989, and the International Conference on Research on ,Management Control Systems, London, 1989. The authors
wish to thank Anthony Hopwood, Deigan ,Morris, the seminar participants (especially Geert Hotktede ) at the University of
I,imburg :md wo anonymous reviewers for their many constructive suggestions for revising this paper.
209
210 CHEE W. CHOW et ai
culture [ of their employees, or the interaction of
these two factors. Resolution of this issue has im-
portant implications for the design of manage-
ment control systems. Lfnational culture or the
interaction of national culture and management
control is a primary determinant of perform-
ance, then there may be little benefit horn
emulating the management controls of firms that
operate in a country with a diRerent culture. On
the other hand, if performance is mainly affected
by the management control system, then
adopting a system that has succeeded in another
country may hold more promise.
To date, no empirical study has directly tested
the effects of national culture and management
control system on manufacturing performance.2
The objective of this study is to conduct some
such tests structured by five hypotheses. The
controlled setting of a laboratory experiment is
used because it offers the advantages of high
internal validity, measurement precision and ac-
curacy, repeatability and control over omitted
variables.3 (The method section discusses
spectilc issues related to the effectiveness of
laboratory experimentation and other research
methods in studying the effects of national cul-
ture. ) The results are consistent with cultural in-
dividualism and the management control system
having signillcant independent, but not inter-
active, effects on manufacturing performance. If
these results are replicated by future research,
then an implication is that the management con-
trol systems used by Asian firms may also be used
by non-Asian firms to improve their perform-
ance.
The remainder of this paper is organized M
follows. The next section provides a review of
the related literature as the basis for developing
five hypotheses. Then the experimental method
is explained and the results of the hypothesis
tests are presented. The final section provides a
summary and discussion,
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
Explanations for manufacturing performance
The extant literature on the determinants of
manufacturing performance provides three
explanations of the Asian firms’ superior per-
formance.
National culture
At one extreme is the explanation that the
Asian firms’ superior manufacturing perform-
ance is primarily attributable to the national
culture of their employees and the design of
management control systems based on that cul-
ture (Cole, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; Pascale & Athos,
198 1). This explanation is consistent with the
contingency theory of organizations (Hall,
1987 ), which proposes that organizational
structure is dependent on orgartizat ional con-
text, and that context and structure interactively
affect performance. While contingency studies
have generally focused on the relationship be-
tween organizational structure (e.g., centraliza-
tion, formalization of rules) and such organiza-
tional context variables as uncertainty, technol-
1Many definitions of corporate and national culture have been proposed ( Adler et al., 1986; Frost et al., 1985; Hofstede. 1980;
Schein, 1985). Similar to Hofstede ( 1980 ), culture is defined here as the common mindset about beliefs, values and goals that
distinguishes one group from another.
‘A voluminous literature in psychology and sociology exists on various aspects of culture and their relations to behavior (e.g.
cognition, socialization, personality development, values, beliefs, and motives ). Excellent reviews of this literature are
avaiIable in Triandis and Brislin ( 1980 ) and St@ ( 1986 ). Segall ( 1986 ) observes that by and large, studies on cultural values
.md motives have been descriptive, with little analysis of either their determinants or consequences. He especially notes a
Iwk of experiments that bear directly on ways to stimulate achievement-oriented behavior. Our search of this literature failed
I{, rc veal any experimental study on how culture and the management control system affect manufacturing performance.
‘A major disadvantage of laboratory experiments, as compared to other methods (e.g. field studies), is reduced external
validity. However, since research in this area is in its infancy, we consider the advantages of laboratory experimentation to
out-weigh its disadvantages. We readily acknowledge the need also to apply other research methods to the issues discussed
m this study.
I
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o= and competition, national culture may also
be an important organizational context variable
that dri~resorg~nizatiomd structure.
It has been observed, for example, that
Japanese culture is characterized by a group ( or
collective ) — as opposed to individual — orien-
tation ( Reischauer, 19=*; Richardson & Veda,
1981; Schein, 1981; Smith, 1983). It is posited
that members of a collective culture view self
development as occurring through harmony and
reciprocity in interpersonal relations and con-
tribut ing to the welfare of other group members
(e.g. clan, work team ). The collective orienta-
tion of Japanese culture, in turn, has been
suggested as the basis for such oft-citedJapanese
management approaches as teams, participative
decision making and quality circles (Lincoln &
.McBride, 1987). In contrast, members of an indi-
vidualistic culture, such as the LJ.S.,are less ready
to take actions solely for their positive effects on
other members of the group ( Hofstede, 1980 ).
Thus, many of the controls frequently used by
U.S. firms (e.g. individual piece rate pay, respon-
sibility accounting ) stem from an individualistic
approach to social organization and work.
To date, direct tests of whether national cul-
ture and management controls jointly allect
manufacturing performance have yet to be re-
ported. However, research using field survey or
field study methods has provided indirect sup-
port for the notion that national culture affects
the effectiveness of alternate management con-
trols. Both Daley et al. ( 1985) and Birnberg and
Snodgrass ( 1988) have found dilTerences be-
tween U.S. and Japanese employees’ attitudes to-
wards various components of a management
control system. Child ( 1981 ) has provided a
review of contingency theory-based studies in
several countries. He notes that while
similarities exist across countries in the context-
structure contingencies, there remains consid-
erable variation across countries that these con-
tingency theory variables cannot explain. Sev-
eral empirical studies of Japanese and Western
(primarily British and U.S. ) firms have found
—
similar context-structure contingencies among
them. though the Japanese firms tended to have
different structures ( Lincoln and .McBridc,
1987 ). This finding is consistent with, national
culture being a potential omitted variable in de-
signing management controls. However, none of
these prior studies had included national culture
or its components as an organizational context
variable.
.Wanufacturing strategy and control
At the other extreme is the explanation that
the Asian firms’ superior manufacturing per-
formance is primmily due to their use of specific
manufacturing strategies and control systems
(e.g. just-in-time/total-quality-control (JIT
TQC)) [Hall, 1983; Hayes, 1981; Hayes &
Wheelwright, 1984; Schonberger, 1986]. Two
experimental studies have provided partial tests
of this explanation.
Huang et at. ( 1983) conducted computer
simulations ofa multiline, multistage “push” pro-
duction system with JIT kanbans.+ The depen-
dent variable was performance, measured as the
total time to produce a given output, WIP inven-
tory levels and total production per regular pro-
duction day. The manufacturing control system
was varied by manipulating the number of pro-
duction kanbans allowed. Huang et al. ( 1983)
also proxied for different production contexts
by varying the shape, mean and variance of the
processing times for each production stage and
the shape and variance of the demand distribu-
tion. The results were consistent with their ex-
pectation that interaction effects exist between
the manufacturing control system and each of
the context variables.
While Huang et al. ( 1983) focused on en-
gineering properties, Young et al. ( 1988)
allowed for human motivational effects by
means of a laboratory experiment using U.S. sub-
jects. The independent variables in their study
were the inventory control system (push vs
pull), the quality control system (process vs out-
put ) and the compensation system (perform-
‘,! l.zmb;mis J paper-based inventory flow system that controls the timing and quantity of production and WIP at each work
wmt )n tiltingan assembly line. A detailed discussion of Iwnbans is available in Monden ( 1983).
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ante contingent vs fixed pay). The dependent
variables were production effectiveness and effi-
ciency. Consistent with their five hypotheses,
Young et al. ( 1988) found that both perform-
ance effectiveness and efficiency were inter-
active fi.mctions of the inventory and quality
control systems and independent functions of
the compensation system.
Thus, both of these prior studies have found
controls used by Asian firms to affect manufac-
turing performance in predicted directions.
However, since neither study included a culture
manipulation, they are unable to examine its ef-
fects on performance.
National culture, strategy and control
The third explanation of the Asian firms’
superior manufacturing performance represents
a compromise between the other mvo explana-
tions. it acknowledges the importance of
national culture to management controls while
arguing for the selective adoption of the Asian
firms’ management approaches (Abegglen &
Stalk, 1985; Pegels, 1984; Sethi et al., 1984;
Weiss, 1984). As such, it posits that national
culture and management controls have both in-
dependent and interactive effects on manufac-
turing performance.
No direct empirical test of this third ex-
planation has yet been reported, though it has re-
ceived some indirect support from field re-
search findings. Horovitz ( 1980 ) examined how
the top managements of British, French and Ger-
man firms viewed and applied management con-
trols. Even though these firms can be presumed
to have national cultures that are more similar to
each other than to those of the Asian countries,
he still found differences among them. Along the
same vein, Kreder & Zeller ( 1988) have re-
ported the use of different control systems in
German and U.S. fins. Another indication that
national culture and management controls may
have independent performance effects is that
while some U.S. firms have experienced success,
others have experienced tiilure, in adopting
such Asian management practices as teams, qual-
ity circles and consensus decision making
(Ansberry & Sasaki, 1985; Bryne, 1986; Levin,
1985; Schonberger, 1986; SeaSe, 1985 ).
Limitations ofprior research
The preceding review indicates that extant re-
search has shed some light on the potential roles
of, and relationship between, national culture
and management controls. However, for pur-
poses of designing management controls, these
prior studies are limited by the lack of direct
tests on whether national culture and manage-
ment controls independently or interactively
affect performance. Furthermore, these studies
have been primarily descriptive. Except for
Birnberg and Snodgrass ( 1988), they have
focused on detecting national differences with-
out addressing which specific national attributes
(e.g. culture, the political system, the economic
climate ) may account for these differences.
They have also dealt only with general (e.g. dele-
gation, formalization ), rather than specific,
characteristics of management control systems.
In conjunction with their lack of analysis of na-
tion-spec~lc attributes, their findings cannot ad-
dress which particular management controls
(e.g. freed vs performance-contingent pay) may
be nation-specific, and which maybe generally
applicable.
Given that the theoretical and empirical litera-
tures are not sufficiently developed to resolve
whether manufacturing performance is a func-
tion of management controls, national culture or
their interaction, direct tests of these effects
would seem to be desirable. Below, five hypoth-
eses about the effects of national culture and
management control on manufacturing per-
formance are developed to guide this explora-
tory study. To facilitate presentation of these
hypotheses, the operationalization of national
culture and management controls in this study is
first explained.
Cultural individualism-collectivism
Experimentally testing the many proposed di-
mensions of national culture is beyond the scope
of this study. We focused on individualism
because the Asian and Western cultures are held
to be particularly divergent on this work-related
attribute ( Akggkn LkStalk, 1985: Adler er (il.,
I!)86:Dore. 19-5: Hofstede, 1980: Richardson&
I’txlti, 1981: Sethi etaf..1984; Smith. 1985). In a
survey of some 80.000 workers from over 70
countries, Hofstede ( 1980) found that the U.S.
and the Asian countries occupy opposite poles
of this dimension. f~n a 0-100 scale, the L~.S.
workers had the highest mean score of all the
countries ( 91 ). The Japanese workers’ mean
score (46 ) was slightlybelow the overall mean
(51 ); much lower means were obtained for
workers from Hong Kong (25 ), Singapore (20),
Thailand (20 ) and Taiwan (17). Indeed,
Hofstede ( 1980) has stated that, given the im-
portance of individualism as a determinant of
behavior, many Lr.S.management practices may
be inappropriate for other countries. Con-
versely, management practices that suit a group-
oriented culture may be inappropriate for U.S.
firms.
Interdependence in control systems
Focusing on individualism led us to select for
study the degree of interdependence across re-
sponsibility centers (e.g. individual employees,
departments or divisions). This choice is based
on the premise that the effectiveness of a man-
agement control system is likely to depend on
the “fit” between the interdependence that it in-
duces and the employees’ individualism.
Thompson ( 1967) has provided an analysis of
three forms of interdependence at the depart-
ment level regarding the division and flow of
work. The simplest is pooled interdependence
in which little, if any, work flows between de-
partments. At the individual worker level, this
form of interdependence is analogous to each
Yvorker having complete control over the work
necessa~ to transform inputs to outputs.
Sequential interdependence involves a serial
link bemeen departments, with the output of
one department being the input to the next
department. This situation is analogous to an
mscmbly line ( either push or pull). The third
form of interdependence is reciprocal, in which
resources or information move back and forth
bct~veen departments. Extant research applying
Thompson’s framework to departments indi-
cates that the effects of management controls de-
pend on the form of interdependence ( Chenhall
& ,Morris, 1986; Hayes, 1977; .MacIntosh & Daft,
1987; Merchant, 1985 ),
Work flow interdependence is one of two types
of inter-worker interdependence examined in
the study. Drawing on Thompson’s framework,
pooled interdependence (i.e. independent work
flow ) occurs when each worker is able and
responsible for performing all of the work neces-
sary to make a unit of output. Sequential inter-
dependence (i.e. dependent work flow) occurs
when each worker is able and responsible for
performing a specific part of the work necessa~
to make a unit of output.
The second type of interdependence
examined is the incentive pay contract, Prior
anal}lical and experimental research have indi-
cated that the pay contract has a signitlcant im-
pact on performance (Baiman, 1982; Chow,
1983; Wailer & Chow, 1985; Demski & Feltham,
1978; Young et u1., 1988). Since the two work
flow conditions differ in how each worker’s
effort translates into units of output, the way that
such output is measured and paid for can
significantly affect workers’ effort incentives, To
examine how the fit between work fiow and pay
interdependence alfects performance, two types
of pay interdependence are used. With indepen-
dent pay, each worker is paid according to his or
her own output. In contrast, each worker under
dependent pay is paid based on his or her work
group’s output.
Crossing the two types of work flow with the
MO pay systems yields four types of control sys-
tem-induced interdependencies. Within this
context, the three explanations of the Asian
firms’ superior manufacturing performance
yield different predictions of performance
effects. The first explanation predicts only a
significant interaction effect among cultural in-
dividualism and the two types of control system-
induced interdependencies. In contrast, the
second explanation predicts only a significant
main effect due to the control system. Finally,
the third explanation predicts both main and in-
teraction effects due to cultural individualism
1
I
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.Experimental procedure
The two-hour experimental session involved
the same steps at each research site,
1. The experimenter read through a written
script which described the experiment as in-
volving issues in management without providing
any further elaboration. Then the nature of the
translation task was explained. After this, each
subject was given a translation key and told to
translate two rows of ten triplets provided on a
separate sheet.
2. After all subjects had completed the two
rows, they were shown the correct translations.
When all subjects indicated that they under-
stood the task, each was given three sheets
containing ten rows often triplets each. The sub-
jects were told to write their names on these
sheets and to translate as many triplets as they
could (in the order given ) in a 15 minute train-
ing period. This performance was used as the
measure of each subject’s PC.S While the sub-
jects were not paid for this work, participation
was a prerequisite for retention in the paying
part of the experiment.
3. Each subject’s sheets were collected to de-
termine the number of triplets that he or she had
correctly translated. While this was in progress,
the subjects completed an interim questionnaire
which included demographic questions and
questions from Hofstede’s ( 1980) culture in-
strument related to individualism (discussed
below).
4. The work groups were formed by assigning
the subjects with the three highest PC scores to
the first group, the next three to the second
group, etc. U’ithin each work group, subjects
were randomly assigned to worker position,
These groups were systematically distributed to
attain mean PC equivalence across the four cells
at each research site,’) The 96 subjects at each
site yielded 32 work groups, and eight groups
were assigned to each of the four work flow
interdependence–pay interdependence condi-
tions.
5. Each subject was given feedback on his or
her PC. Next, each read through a set of detailed
written instructions specitlc to his or her experi-
mental treatment and worker position. These in-
structions explained the work flow and how the
subject’s output and cash pay would be deter-
mined. Then the subjects were given new sets of
triplets and translation keys and told to perform
the task for a 45 minute production period. 10
6. At the end of 45 minutes, each subject com-
pleted a post-experiment questionnaire contain-
ing manipulation check questions and other
measures, then the experimental materials were
collected. Pay was calculated and disbursed
later.
RESULTS
Man ipulation checks
Manipulation checks were performed for indi-
vidualism, work flow interdependence and pay
interdependence. The results indicated that
these experimental manipulations did produce
the intended relative effects.
W’his measure of performance capability is adopted from Chow ( 1983 ), w~ler & Chow ( 1985 ), Chow et al. ( 19$38J ~d
Shields & Wailer ( 1988 ). As Watler & Chow ( 1985, footnote 3 ) have observed, a potential limitation of this measure is that
it ”..captures a skill-effort combination rather than skillper se.” It is important to recognize that in most real world tasks —
including tests of intelligence — performance is necessarily jointly determined by an individual’s skill and effort. To identify
the unique contributions of skill and effort is diffkult, if not impossible. Note that in the tests for performance effects, each
subject’s performance in the production period is normalized by his or her performance capability. To the extent that this
measure of performance capability already includes some effort level, the tests relate to the marginal effects oneffortof the
experimental variables.
?5ince administration of the experiment was highly labor-intensive (e.g. counting the number of triplets that each subject had
correctly translated in the training period, assigning subjects to treatments and worker positions), the subjects at both sites
were processed in severat separate sessions. This permitted systematic rotation of subject assignment to treatment by
performance capability ( i.e. the top PC group was assigned to a different treatment at each administration, etc. ) to attain pre-
experimental equivalence across treatments.
“’sets of triplets dilferent from those in the tmining period were used to control for potential confounding by learning.
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TABLE I Cultural individualism1
( .V = 96 for each mean).—
(“s Singdpore
Qucs[i(m ,Mcan S D. Mean S.D. t= p=
l.uisufc time: 1.65 0.68 1.98 063 3.52 0.001
Ut)rkingconditmns+ I.88 (),=6 2.0-’4 0.83 145
(cooperation’
0.15
2.02 ().68 1.68 0.66 3.56
(>u*liry{Jflivtng envlrt)nmenti
() 00 I
1.80 0.66 2.22 0.80 395 0001
‘SCJICanchors. 1 = “of utmost importance”; 5 = “of very little importance.”
“’Have sufficient time left for your personal or family life,”
“’Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc. ).”
““Work with people who cooperate well with one another.”
“’Live in an area desirable to you and your family.”
Individualism was measured using responses
to the four questions in Hofstede’s ( 1980) in-
strument. These questions asked each subject to
indicate the importance to him or her of four job
attributes: good physical working conditions,
good interpersonal cooperation, leisure time
and quality of the living environment. The five-
point response scales were anchored by 1 = “of
utmost importance” and 5 = “of very little im-
portance”. Table 1 presents the means and stand-
ard deviations of the Singapore and U.S. subjects’
responses to the four questions.
According to Hofstede ( 1980), more impor-
tance being placed on good working conditions
and good interpersonal relations implies a col-
lective orientation, while a relative emphasis on
leisure time and a good living environment im-
plies an individualistic orientation. It should be
noted that while these questions may appear
oblique, Hofstede found that it was necessary to
pose questions at this level of generality for
people from radically diflerent cultures to un-
derstand them.
L’sing factor and regression analyses, Hofstede
( 1980, 1982) developed weights for combining
the four questions into an individualism scale,
with a range of zero (low) to 100 (high). This
scale yields one value for each cultural group,
and has been used by %eters and Schreuder
( 1988) to test the relative effects of national vs
organizational culture in CPA firms that operate
in The Netherlands. The scores of our L’.S. and
Singapore samples on this scale were 55 and 31,
respectively.
While the directional relation between the
U.S. and Singapore subjects’ individualism scores
is as expected, the ddlerence is much smaller
than that reported in Hofstede ( 1980) (i.e. 91
for the U.S. vs 20 for Singapore). This result is
due, at least in part, to the mean response to one
of the four questions being contrary to the pre-
dicted direction. Table 1 shows that the U.S. sub-
jects placed greater importance (smaller mean
values ) on leisure time and quality of living en-
vironment, while the Singapore subjects consi-
dered having good cooperation among workers
more important than did the U.S. subjects. The
directional d~erence between the two groups
was highly significant for each question by a t-
test (all P = 0.001; Table 1) and supported the
ex ante classillcation of subjects. However, con-
trary to expectations, the U.S. subjects indicated
that good working conditions were more im-
portant than did the Singapore subjects (X =
1.88 and 2.04, respectively ). Even though this
difference was not statistically significant (P =
0.15 )} it still reduced the difference between the
two groups’ scores on the combined scale. 11
1‘IIofstede ( 19t10 ) showed that on 5-point “importance”’ scales, the countries in his study exhibited “acquiescence” effects
( I r ~wtsistently scoring eve~ item as being lessor more impomant),andthat thiseffect isnegativelycorrelated withcultural
lndi\iduidism. his effect is not reflected in Table 1. [n fact, the average response of the more individualistic U.S.subjects to
rhc four items ( 1.8+ ) was lower than that for the more collectivismSingaporeans ( 1.98), Adjusting for the acquiescence effect
t deducting the difference of 0.14 points from the Singaporean scores) does not affect the conclusions about the difference
hcrw cc-n the MO groups. However. the difference on “working conditions’” becomes even less significant ( 1.88 vs 1.90).
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One potential explanation for this result is that
the student subjects had only partially de-
veloped their work-related values.
The work flow and pay interdependence man-
ipulations were tested by examining responses
to two statements, “I was able to produce a com-
plete unit of output by myself,” and “My pay was
dependent on the performance of the other two
workers in my department. ” Both seven-point
response scales were anchored by 1 = “very in-
accurate” and 7 = “very accurate”. The mean
response to the former statement was signific-
antly higher for the independent work flow sub-
jects than for the dependent work flow subjects
(X= 5.94 and 3.00, respectively; t = 9.75, P <
0.00 1). The mean responses to the second state-
ment also differed significantly between the de-
pendent and independent pay conditions in the
expected direction (X = 5.43 and 2.96, respec-
tively; t = 8.28, P < 0.001). These results
suggest that both interdependence manipula-
tions were successful.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by cell
for the variables used in the hypothesis tests;
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics by cell
averaged over worker position. Table 4 contains
a correlation matrix for PC, work experience,
cultural individualism, and absolute and nor-
malized performance. There was a marginally
signtilcant difference between the mean PCs of
the high and low individualism subjects (X =
221 and 212, respectively, t = 1.80,P = 0.07).
To control for performance differences due to
this preexperimental difference, *zeach subject’s
absolute performance (i.e. number of triplets
translated in the 45 minute production period)
was normalized by his or her PC in the hypo-
thesis tests. Table 2 shows that both mean abso-
lute performance and normalized performance
had considerable between-cell differences.
The subjects’ self-reported years of full time
equivalent work experience had a mean for the
high individualism subjects of 3.53 as compared
to 0.95 for the low individualism subjects. Since
these means were significantly different ( t =
7.12, P < 0.001 ), years of full time equivalent
work experience was included as a covariate in
the hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis tests
H1 was tested with the entire sample. Subsets
of the sample were used to test the four direc-
tional hypotheses.
Testsof HI. An analysis of all the subjects’ data
was conducted using a 23 by 3 between-subjects
ANCOVA [Keppel, 1982]. Normalized perform-
ance was the dependent variable, years of work
experience was the covariate, the dichotomous
independent variables were cultural indi-
vidualism, work flow dependence and pay sys-
tem dependence, and worker position had three
levels.
Table 5 shows that the overall model was sig-
nificant (F= 1.93, P = 0.009), and that the effect
due to the work experience covariate was not
significant (P = 0.25 ). The three-way inter-
action among individualism, work flow inter-
dependence and pay interdependence was not
signtilcant (F = 1.47’, P = 0.227). The two-way
interactions between individualism and either
work flow or pay interdependence were also not
significant (P = 0.21 and 0.41, respectively).
Thus, the first explanation of the Asian firms’
superior manufacturing performance was not
supported.
Both the second and third explanations of the
Asian firms’ manufacturing performance were
partially supported. As Table 5 indicates, there
were significant main effects due to cultural indi-
vidualism, pay interdependence and worker
position, though not for work flow interdepen-
dence. In addition, two interactions — work
flow interdependence by pay interdependence
and work flow interdependence by worker posi-
tion — were marginally signfilcant. Below, the
only effect interpreted is cultural individualism.
The other significant main effects were also part
1‘Controlling for performance capability is important because prior studies using a similar task have found that actual
performance is significantly related to this subject attribute ( Wailer & Chow, 1985; Chow et al., 1988).
TABLE 2. (;ell means und standttrd deviations
(N= 8 for each cdl)
(:ulnmd individtdism Low
Work tlow Indepcnt-lent Depencient
t%dy Independent Depcnden[ Indcpcndcm Dcpcntlcml
Worker 1 2 s 1 .2 3 1 2 3 1 .2 5
—.
Work experience (years ) x 2.65 I.03 ().95 ().90 I.02 0..31 1.16 1.52 ().48 (). 16 ()..l5 ().86
.s 4.09 1.(M ().68 1.18 0.98 ().4() 1.27 1.+() ().94 (). 14 ().26 ().86
Perf{)rnlwce udpability (P(:) X 209.38 206.00” 200.25” 212. S8 209.()() 217.63 209.15 206.75 197.25 226.65 228.()() 225.75
.s 24.21 27.10 32.01 26.60 30..25 26.47 S5.N9 31.s6 37.98 52.33 S().67 29.59
Absolute performance x 822.00 859.38 694.00 805.(K) 820.88 706.13 791.13 750.75 698.58 839.75 81().58 780.1S
.s 98.98 10.2.50 t34.70 147.90 115.68 91.26 157. 1.3 I 12.?N 124. OS 116.27 112.20 12(}.2+
Normalized performance x ~y(, 4.20 3.50 3.85 jg~ 3.29 5.85 S.67 5.56 3.75 .+.5H 3.46
.s 0.57 ~,47 ().78 ()92 (),67 0.60 ().94 ().58 ().33 0.66 0.53 ().+s
High
Independent Dependent
Independent Drqxndent Independent Dependent
1 2 s 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 s-— -..———....—— -. .————
3.41 4,31 3.22 5.(M) 5.37 2.03 1.69 2.31 2.69 4.59 4.06 5.74
2.78 1.62 2.46 4.65 6.50 2.10 1.34 2.51 2.X) 3.15 3.45 2.16
219,75 225,~~ 219.50 217,75 215.88 220. l.j 223.88 224.00 233.63 223.88 221.88 217.58
39.35 44.87 33.70 45.45 36.27 31.54 4~.W 41.5~ 4S~~ 3~.13 36.76 3571
796.75 904.88 781.75 715.13 747.63 66363 ~2~25 ~~)35~ 749~() ~OJ I ~ 794.63 7460~
159.08 210.96 133.21 197.64 207.78 171.92 1 I2.08 13X.12 1.3610 196.79 197.81 209.54
?).62 4.(M) 5.57 3.25 3,43 2,99 5.70 3.()() 3.56 s.% .+55 5.39
o.??l ().58 0.42 (). 39 0.5!) ().48 0.35 028 ().14 (). $4 ().44 ().52..—.
——. —-
N
N
o
TABLE3. Mtirginalmeans and standard deviations
(averaged over worker position )— —
Cultural individualism Low High
Work flow bwfcpcndtmt Dependent Indcpcndrmt Dcpcndtmt
Pay Independent Dependent lndeprmckmt Dependent Independent Dependent Independent Dependent—— .——_.
Absolute performance x 7gt7~ 777.33 746.75 810.08 827.79 708.79 790,92 781.25
s 150.13 126.3 I 132.45 1 I 5.82 172.59 187.81 127.41 19’4.21
Normalized perfornmncc x 3.89 3.71 3.70 3.(M) 3.73 3.22 3.55 3.50
s ().65 ().77 (),65 0.54 0.47 0.51 ().29 ().43——— _————.
TABLE +. Pearson cnrrckrt ions
(signiticmlcc Icvcl ifP <0.10 )
Work (:uhural Absulutu Normalized
experimrce individualism perfbrmimce performance
f% 0.0s ().01 0.67 –0.19
(<0.001 ) (0.005)
Work 0.18 –0.03 –0.08
experience (0.007)
Cultural –0.03 –0.07
indivicfuafism
Absolute ().59
pcrformtincc (<0.001 )
EFFE(:TS ( )X \lANl F,A{.Tl‘RIN(; PERFOKS1.W(:E ~~,
T.ARIE ~. .L~t:~J~.~ rc+ults for normalized performance—
Etkx[. d/: ‘ F [’
\lOdcl 1.93 0.009
(:ulturc ((:) 1 5.+3 ().()2 1
\\’{n-ktl<)u( U F ) 1 o.+- () +96
Pay(P) 1 6.91 ().009
\\”fJrkertl)iiti(m ( VP) ~ H09 <().()() 1
(. x vi’F 1 1 55 ().215
(.XP 1 (),6- (),+13
c x W’P 2 0.51 ().599
V’F X P 1 3.08 ().()8 1
V“FX W“P ~ 2.64 ().0-4
pxwP 2 ().0+ ().963
CXW’FXP 1 l.+- 0.227
(;x W’F X WP ~ o.-il 0.624
CXPXW’P 2 0.00 0.998
WFXPXWP ~ 0.2+ 0.-86
CXV’FXPXWP ~ O.O= 0.955
Work experience 1 135 0247
1Numerator d.J: denominator dj’ = 167.
of significant interactions, and main effects
should not be interpreted as indicating linear ef-
fects when significant interactions exist ( Neter
and Wasserman, 1974 ).
The significant (F = 5.43, P = 0.02) cultural
individualism main effect is due to the lower in-
dividualism subjects having a higher level of nor-
malized performance (X = 3.-2 vs 3,50). Vltile
this result is consistent with performance being
directly affected by national culture, this in-
terpretation is subject to two caveats. First, even
though pay per unit of output was varied
between the two research sites to make them
equivalent relative to the local pay scale (see
footnote 6), strict equivalence still may not have
been attained. 13
Second, the normalizing procedure may have
introduced a bias against the high individualism
subjects. Recall that the individual PCs were ob-
tained by having each subject perform the trans-
lation task by himself or herself. Given that the
PC session was individualistic in nature, the high
individualism subjects may have performed at a
higher level than the low individualism subjects.
In turn, normalizing each subject’s absolute per-
formance by his or her PC could have depressed
the high individualism subjects’ performance
measures relative to those of the low indi-
vidualism subjects,’+
The marginally signitlcant (F = 3.08, P =
0.08 ) interaction between work flow and pay
interdependence is consistent with the contin-
gency view that the fit among elements of a con-
‘ ‘There is indirect evidence that our attempt to equalize the pay scales was successtil. The exit questionnaire asked each
subject to indicate his or her satisfaction with his or her total pay for the work performed. The seven-point scale was anchored
by 1 = “ve~ satisfied” and - = “very dissatisfied.” The Singapore and U.S. samples did not have significantly different mean
responses ( 3.82 and 3.8+, respectively; t = 0.08, P = 0.93).
‘‘Recall that each subject’s own PCwasused to normalize his or her absolute performance. ffabsolute performance had been
used as the dependent variable, the results would have been confounded by the rather substantial interpersonal PC
differences. While normalizing may have potentially biased the individualism main effects in all the hypothesis tests that used
both the (“S and Singapore subjects. it was unlikely to have affected the interaction effects. Consider the following example.
.issume that in the PC session, the high individualism subjects had performed at a level of 100 while the low individualism
subjects had performed at 80 (due to different degrees of “fit”’with the nature of the task). Further, assume that in the
experimental session, the high individualism subjects who had been assigned to a dependent (independent) condition had
performed w 90 ( 100), while the corresponding low individualism subjects had performed at 90 and 80, respectively. In this
example. even though the high individualism subjects had a higher mean level of absolute performance, their normalized
performance would be lower than that of the low individualism subjects (0.95 vs 1.05). However, for both the high and low
indiI idudlsrn subjects. the subgroup which had the better “tit”with the dependency condition would still show a higher level
of n(mmalizedperformance ( 1.0 vs 0,9 for the high individualism subjects; 1.1 vs 1.0 for the low individualism subjects). Note
.&I that since the subjects were not paid in the PC session, neither the main nor interaction effects for the pay dependency
tr~ii[ment wtis likely to have been fiected. It can be readily shown that ifa group task had been used in the PC session, then
tlwn(]rmdizing procedure would have introduced a potential bias against the low individualism subjects instead. in either
ewe. I biased mean level of normalized performance for the entire sample would have inflated the variance and reduced the
p(m.cr (Jt’th~t statistical tests, In hindsight, PC sessions perhaps could have been conducted using both individual and group
tmlis,md each subject’s performance averaged across them.
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trol system aflects performance. When indepen-
dent pay was matched with independent work
flow, normalized performance was higher (X =
3.81 ) than when it was matched with dependent
work flow (X = 3.62). Similarly, normalized per-
formance was higher when dependent pay was
matched with dependent work flow (X = 3.55)
than when it was matched with independent
work flow (~ = 3.47).
The marginally significant (F = 2.64, P =
0.07 ) interaction between work flow depen-
dence and worker position is caused by there
being di.tTerent patterns of means over workers
for work flow dependence and independence.
When work flow was independent, the second
worker’s normalized performance was the high-
est of the three workers (X = 3.67, 3.90 and
3.34, respectively ). The data that were collected
did not permit an analysis of how this result may
have come about. A potential explanation is that
the second worker was subject to greater non-
pecuniary motivational effects (e.g., competi-
tion ) due to having reference points on both
sides. 1~
When work flow was dependent, normalized
performance decreased across worker position
(X = 3.71, 3.60 and 3.44, respectively). While
these difTerent patterns are consistent with work
flow interdependence having a motivational
effect, such an interpretation may be premature.
Recall that under the dependent work flow con-
dition, it was not possible for a worker to per-
form higher than the preceding worker. The
declining mean normalized performance across
worker positions under dependent work flow is
consistent with such a physical constraint being
operative.
To control for the constraining effects of work
flow dependence on output, we performed two
reduced form ANCOVAS using dilTerent subsets
of the sample. The results were not qualitatively
different horn those reported above. The first
ANCOVA excluded the dependent work flow
condition to test the effects of cultural indi-
vidualism and pay interdependence with ail
three workers. This ANCOVA model was signifi-
cant (F = 2.86, P = 0.002); all three main effects
were sigrtitlcant but none of the interactions was
significant (P > 0.10 ). As before, cultural indi-
vidualism was significant (F = 5.61, P = 0.02),
with the low individualism subjects outperform-
ing the high individualism subjects (.Y = 3.80,
3.48 ). Normalized performance was signtil-
cantly higher when pay was independent than
when it was dependent (X = 3,81, 3.47; F =
8.31, P = 0.005). The worker position effect was
also significant (F = 7.23, P = 0.001),with
worker two having the highest normalized per-
formance (X= 3.67, 3.90, 3.34, respectively ).
The second ANCOVA retained the dependent
work flow condition but only included worker
one (whose output was not constrained by that
of other workers in the group). This reduced-
form NNCOVA model was not significant (F =
0.92, P = 0.51). There was only one signillcant
effect, cultural individualism (F = 9.91, P =
0.05 ), again with the low individualism subjects
having a higher normalized performance (X =
3.85, 3.53).
Tests of fY2-115. Inferential tests of H2–H5
were performed using several reduced-form
models of the complete 23 by 3 between-
subjects ANCOVA. In each of these ANCOVAS,
normalized performance was the dependent var-
iable, years of work experience was the
covariate, and the independent variables were
worker position with three levels and various
combinations of the three dichotomous factors
— cultural individualism, work flow interdepen-
dence and pay interdependence. For all but one
of these AhICOVAs, the worker position main
effect was signtilcant (P < 0.05); the effect was
marginally significant (P < 0.10 ) for that one
exception. Worker position was not involved in
any interaction effects (P <0.10 ).
H2 predicted that workers with a low indi-
vidualistic cultural orientation perform higher
i<[n all conditions at both research sites, worker three had both the lowest mean absolute and normalized performance. This
result is explainable for the subjects in a dependent work flow condition; its persistence in the independent work tlow
condition is puzzling since the subjects had been randomly assigned to worker position.
EFFE(:TS ()X \l.\N( F.A(:TL’RIXGPERFOR\lAN(:E ~~+
when w’ork flow”ml or pa}” are dependent, and
k)~ver when work flow andjor pay are inclepen-
dent. This prediction was tested with a 2 by 2 by
.+ANCOVA using only those subjects in the low
individualistic culture condition. Work flow,
pay, find worker position were the independent
variables. Mean normalized performance was
lower with it dependent w independent work
tlo~~’( .Y = .5.65 w 3.80) and dependent vs in-
dependent pay system (X = 3.65 w 3.79),
though neither mean difference was signtilcant
(F(1,83)= 1.60, P=0.21; F(1,83)= 1.55, P=
0.22, respectively). Hence, H2 was not sup-
ported.lc’
H3 predicted that workers with a high indi-
vidualistic cultural orientation perform higher
when work flow andlor pay are independent,
and lower when work flow and/or pay are
dependent. This prediction was tested with a 2
by 2 by 3 AiiCOVA which included only those
subjects in the high individualistic culture con-
dition. Work flow, pay, and worker position
were the independent variables. The interaction
between pay and work flow was signtilcant (F( 1,
83) = 6.85, P = 9.01). Mean normalized per-
formance was highest when both pay and work
flow were in the independent condition (X =
3.73 ). Consistent with H3, when pay was in-
dependent, mean normalized performance was
higher with independent vs dependent work
flow (X= 3.73 vs 3.55). However, when pay was
dependent, mean normalized performance was
higher, rather than lower, when work flow was
dependent vs independent (X = 3.50 vs 3.22).
Thus, H3 was only partially supported.
H4 predicted that when there is work flow
and’or pay dependence, workers with a low in-
dividualistic cultural orientation out-perform
workers with a high individualistic cultural
orientation. This prediction was tested with two
separate 2 by 3 AINCOVASusing only subjects in
the work flow or pay dependence conditions.
Cultural individualism and worker position
were the independent variables. When pay was
.
dependent, the low individualism subjects had a
significantly higher mean normalized pert_orm-
ance (.Y = 3.65 vs 3.36; F(1. 89) = -i.25, P =
0.04).Their mean normalized performance was
also higher when work flow was dependent,
though this difference was not statistically sig-
nillcant(X = 3.65 w 3.53; F(I,89) = 0.37,P =
0.54).These results provide partial support for
Hi.
H5 predicted that when there is work flow
and/or pay independence, workers with a high
individualistic cultural orientation outperform
workers with a low individualistic cultural
orientation. This prediction was tested with two
separate 2 by 3 ANCOVAS using only the
subjects in the work flow or pay independence
conditions. Cultural individualism and worker
position were the independent variables. When
pay was independent, the high individualism
subjects had a lower, rather than higher, mean
normalized performance, though this difference
was not statistically significant (X = 3.64 vs 3.79;
F( 1, 89) = 1.66, P = 0.20) .Whenworkflowwas
independent, the high individualism subjects
had a significantly lower mean normalized per-
formance (X = 3.48 vs 3.80; F( 1, 89) = 5.16,P
= 0.03). These results are contrary to H5.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
An important question being asked today is
whether the management control systems of
Asian manufacturing firms can be used by non-
Asian firms to improve their manufacturing per-
formance. Answering this question requires
consideration of differences between the Asian
and non-Asian firms in their employees’ national
cultures, their countries’ economic and political
infrastructures, as well as their management
control systems. Given the complexity of this
issue and the dearth of extant research, this
study conducted a laboratory experiment to
“T() control for the physical constraining effects of the dependent work flow condition, the ANCOVASfor all four directional
11}pothcses were also conducted by using either only’the subjects in the dependent work flow condition, or only worker one.
“1’herewlts were not qualitatively affected.
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provide some formal evidence on the question
while not overwhelming the project with factors
that are important but tangential to the im-
mediate focus. The extant theoretical and empir-
ical literatures provided the basis for five
hypotheses to guide this exploratory study.
The results of testing H 1 indicated that
national culture and management controls had
independent, but not interactive, effects on per-
formance. (Recall, however, that the result for
national culture was subject to two important
caveats. See footnotes 13 and 14. ) Considering
only the management control system, perform-
ance increased as the fit between pay and work
flow interdependence increased (i.e. both
elements were either independent or depen-
dent ).
The evidence relating to the four directional
hypotheses was mixed. H2 was rejected because
subjects with a low individualistic cultural
orientation were not found to perform higher
when the control system induced interdepen-
cies among the workers in a group. H3 was only
partially supported for the high individualism
subjects because of an interaction between pay
and work flow. With a dependent pay system,
performance was higher when there was an
independent work flow. However, with an inde-
pendent pay system, performance was higher
with a dependent work flow. The evidence also
provided partial support for H4. When pay was
interdependent among workers, the low indi-
vidualism subjects outperformed the high
individualism subjects. Finally, H5 was not sup-
ported. The high individualism subjects did not
outperform the low individualism subjects
under either independent work flow or pay.
These resuIts have two potentially important
implications for the design of management con-
trol systems. First, they do not refute the pos-
sibility of a specific system being effective in
highly diverse national cultures. Second,
irrespective of national culture, interdependen-
cies induced by the control system among
employees affected performance. It is important
to note, however, that making such generaliza-
tions to practice is premature.
First, as was pointed out earlier, all research
studies are affected by the cultural predisposi-
tion of the researchers, subjects and readers.
While this study has attempted to minimize this
bias, some probably remains. To reduce this
problem in the design and conduct of studies,
future research should, for example, use cross-
cultural research teams. Beyond this, multiple
research methods should be used to detect any
remaining bias.
Second, like all experimental research, the
results of this study are functions of the spectilc
experimental task, subjects and parameter
values. The robustness of the findings needs to
be tested against variations in these aspects of
the experiment. For example. using subjects
who have more work experience or managerial
(instead of assembly-line) tasks may increase the
ability to detect the effects of work-related
cultural characteristics. Lengthening the experi-
mental session may increase the chances of ob-
taining steady state effects. In addition to
measuring total output, future research should
include other ditnensions of performance such
as quality. Future research could also use a task
that allows for more unconstrained interaction
within work groups. It is also desirable to
expand the scope of the empirical investigation
to include field and survey studies.
There are at least two major directions for
future research on culture and management
controls. First, focusing on national culture,
Hofstede ( 1980) has found considerable varia-
tion across countries in other cultural predis-
positions of workers. For example, there is varia-
tion in workers’ uncertainty avoidance. Since
this cultural predisposition may affect risk taking
behavior, research could be undertaken to
examine its effects on controls designed to
encourage decisions and actions that have par-
ticular risk (e.g. imovation, change) or temporal
(e.g. long-term investments) characteristics.
Hofstede has also reported wide variation across
countries in workers’ predispositions towards
power distance, which is the extent to which
workers accept inequality in vertical social
relations (e.g. superior-subordinate ). Whether
this cultural tendency tiects the most effective
level of decentralization and participation in
management control systems is worthy of invcs- mcnt controls, national culture and organizfi-
tigation. se~(~nd. U p~)intcd out by %eters and tional culture independently and interactive}
Sc’hrcuder ( 19W3 ), research into how manage- affect performance would also be valuable.
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